Abstract. A primary goal of the US Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 is to slow the increase in disaster losses by emphasizing a proactive approach focusing on predisaster hazard mitigation, rather than postdisaster relief. The legislation requires local communities to produce hazard-mitigation plans that include multihazard maps, signifying a de facto prioritization of mitigation dollars on the basis of areas with the greatest vulnerability. However, there is little formal or practical guidance for communities on how to produce such maps. We propose a methodology for hazard-vulnerability assessments using multihazard mapping, where hazard frequency is a measure of risk, historical dollar losses are a proxy for infrastructure impact or exposure, and the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) evaluates human vulnerability. Using a test case of one county, Charleston, South Carolina, a geographic information system spatially combined these dimensions of vulnerability across multiple hazards. The resulting maps provide a tool for hazard-mitigation planning, which contains an initial screening element to highlight zones of highest multihazard vulnerability. The approach helps to generate a view of not just what is at risk, but who is at risk, and where, thus enhancing the implementation of targeted impact-reduction strategies.
Introduction
Societal impacts from hazards continue to escalate globally, despite sustained national efforts to understand their causal mechanisms and ameliorate their impacts. In the United States the mounting financial, human, and environmental impacts are a function of the increasing movement of people and property in highly exposed areas (Cutter et al, 2007) . Several federal and state initiatives recognize the importance of reducing losses through predisaster preparedness and mitigation efforts rather than through postdisaster relief. In particular, the US Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) attempts to stem the tide of escalating hazard losses with a formal endorsement of predisaster mitigation. In addition to traditional structural projects, potential mitigation tools include prevention, property protection, public education and awareness, natural-resource protection, and emergency services. To help apply these tools, DMA 2000 requires a hazard and vulnerability assessment, based on the development of multihazard maps, with clear implications for prioritizing mitigation dollars for the areas of greatest vulnerability. Unfortunately, communities receive little guidance on how to construct such maps and how to use them in the planning process.
US federal hazard-policy responses to increasing impacts have generally been hazard specific. For example, the National Flood Insurance Program encourages community adoption and enforcement of floodplain management ordinances to reduce flood damage. The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program promotes research and implementation of earthquake mitigation. Provisions in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 establish emergency planning and response guidance for commercial nuclear reactors.Vulnerability analyses stemming from programs such as these have advanced our understanding of specific hazards. However, hazardmitigation and emergency managers aiming to reduce impacts often contend with a range of hazards. A typical output of multihazard mapping initiatives is an atlas depicting the location of individual hazards (FEMA, 1997) , but lacking details regarding frequency and severity at the local level. Relatively little work has focused on how to integrate multiple hazards into a comprehensive all-hazards vulnerability analysis at local to regional scales.
We demonstrate a geographic information system (GIS)-based methodology for the spatial combination of multiple hazards, based on hazard risk, impacts (or exposure), and social vulnerability. While the basic concept has been elucidated previously (Cutter et al, 2000) , the ways in which exposure and impact are measured, coupled with a GIS-based analytical approach, provide a new way to conceptualize the overall hazardousness of a place. We demonstrate the approach using Charleston County, South Carolina as our initial test-bed, but recognize the utility of the approach for other countries in the US as well as other subnational administrative units elsewhere in the world.
DMA 2000 vulnerability assessment
The DMA 2000 requirements for the content of hazard-mitigation plans are in the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR, 2002, title 44, part 201, section 6) . Among these are descriptions of the type, location, and extent of relevant hazards, and a risk-based characterization of hazard vulnerability. The DMA 2000 vulnerability assessment includes descriptions of the buildings and infrastructure in hazard-prone areas, estimated dollar losses, and information regarding land use and development trends (CFR, 2002) . South Carolina implements these requirements in both its state hazard mitigation plan (SCEMD, 2007) and the plans of those counties and communities that it approves. The process generally examines all natural hazards affecting the study area, maps hazard zones and important infrastructure, compiles historical built-environment damages and human injuries and fatalities, and collects basic demographic data. Potential dollar losses are tallied using a combination of statistical analyses of historical losses, and loss-estimation software such as HAZUS (http://www.fema.gov/hazus/), and then ranked by hazard to help prioritize mitigation alternatives.
While this procedure is in agreement with the requirements of DMA 2000, it fails to characterize hazard vulnerability in several important ways. First, the geographic locations and extent of a given hazard are portrayed through maps, yet the spatial variation in losses within hazard zones generally is not. Second, the approach proceeds through an analysis of individual hazards, without consideration of the combined effects. Combining hazard zones and impacts across the study area means that mitigation projects could be selected on the basis of rankings of geographic locations susceptible to multiple hazards versus the current prioritization method, which is based largely on the rank order of individual hazards. Third, most of the impacts focus on economic losses to the built environment rather than on the impacts on people, such as injuries or lives lost. This skews mitigation decisions in the direction of infrastructure projects. A more inclusive analysis might suggest nonstructural approaches such as warning systems, evacuation protocols, and outreach programs, which could reduce vulnerability at a lower cost to the community. Finally, the current process is both data and labor intensive, resulting in an excess of resources spent on risk assessment, monies that could easily be spent on future mitigation projects. A screening tool would be useful in this respect, to help focus the hazard risk assessment on the most dangerous hazards and locations. We offer a GIS-based approach to help overcome these shortcomings in the existing hazard-vulnerability assessments.
Background

Conceptual advancements
The literature is replete with different conceptualizations of hazards and vulnerability, and with approaches for measuring them such as the development of indicators (Birkmann, 2006; Birkmann and Fernando, 2008) and comparative risk assessments Gruntfal et al, 2006) . We adhere to the broadest definition of hazard as threats to people and things they value. Hazard assessments are descriptive and entail the identification of the hazards, their likelihood of occurring, as well as their impacts or consequences on people and places. The simplest expression of this is the formulation: hazards equals risk times vulnerability (H R6V ). Risk is expressed as the probability of the occurrence of an event with a specific intensity, place, and period of time (Cardona, 2004) . It also includes the probability of a particular level of an adverse outcome (Kasperson et al, 1988; Villagra¨n de Leö n, 2006) , including property loss, mortality, and injury. Vulnerability, reflecting a lack of capacity and assets to effectively absorb hazard effects, includes an exposure component (how many people or structures) and a sensitivity component (who or what is more likely to suffer adversely) (Cutter et al, 2008) . Assessing vulnerability can be challenging because it has been conceived as both representing predisaster inherent conditions of a system and a direct outcome of hazard effects (Villagra¨n et Leö n, 2006) . In the US, hazard-vulnerability analyses are applied most often to the built environment, with a focus on risk exposure, physical damage, and economic losses. The economic losses may be direct, specifically, damage to buildings and infrastructure, or indirect, caused by ripple effects on the local economy. In contrast, social-vulnerability analyses examine the social, economic, political, and institutional factors that lead to differential susceptibility or sensitivity in human impacts even in the face of common risk exposures. If a holistic understanding of disaster risk is to be achieved it is important to incorporate aspects of multiple hazards (natural systems), social vulnerability (social systems), and built-environment vulnerability (human-constructed systems) (Cardona, 2004; Mileti, 1999) .
Previous efforts
The suite of hazards affecting a community has origins that may be geophysical (earthquake, volcano), meteorological (tornado, hurricane), hydrological (flood), or technological (hazardous materials). Finding commonalities to devise an approach for combining different hazards can be challenging. However, many hazards, regardless of origin, share a set of characteristics that facilitates comparison with one another. These include intensity, magnitude, frequency, rate of onset, duration, temporal spacing, and area of extent (Cutter, 2005) . The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ties the use of these characteristics into the term`hazard identification', defined as``the process of defining and describing a hazard, including its physical characteristics, magnitude and severity, probability and frequency, causative factors, and locations/areas affected'' (FEMA, 1997, page xxv).
In one of the first attempts at multihazard analysis, magnitude and frequency were used as common characteristics in an investigation that tabulated atmospheric, hydrologic, geologic, and biological hazards for the London region of southwestern Ontario (Hewitt and Burton, 1971) . That study included a discussion of thresholds for the inclusion of hazards in the analysis, for a variety of human impacts such as property damage, mortality and injury, and disruption of services. In the mid-1990s FEMA began promulgating hazard-mitigation actions at the community level through its Project Impact program. In its national mitigation strategy, FEMA implicitly backed the use of multihazard analysis in arguing that risk-reduction measures from various hazards should be compatible (FEMA, 1997) . However, the report also defined risk assessment as a process associated with a specific hazard. A formal endorsement of multihazard analysis in predisaster hazard mitigation was included in DMA 2000. The act required the preparation of multihazard advisory maps to identify areas of overlapping hazards and inform the public about hazard risks. The promotion of multihazard analysis first in FEMA's Project Impact program and then in DMA 2000 served as an impetus for several efforts in the transition away from the single-hazard focus.
Several previous research efforts have focused on methodological approaches assessing multihazard vulnerability. In 1997 the Hazards Research Laboratory at the University of South Carolina described a GIS-based methodology for place-based vulnerability analysis. The approach integrated multihazard frequency and social vulnerability modeled using demographic variables (Cutter et al, 1997) . Using this knowledge, the Coastal Services Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) soon produced a GIS-based software called the community vulnerability assessment (CVA) tool. The CVA implemented a methodology that combined hazards according to characteristics of frequency, area of impact, and potential damage magnitude (Flax et al, 2002) . However, the most common attribute used to compare the effects of different hazards has been economic impact. Economic losses are the primary metric used to evaluate hazard impacts in FEMA's HAZUS loss-estimation software, for example. This GIS-based software is designed to compute losses to the built environment from flooding, earthquake, and hurricane winds, and is intended for use by local hazard-mitigation planners and emergency managers (Schneider and Schauer, 2006) .
More recently, GIS was used to conduct a statewide multihazard analysis for Kentucky (Simpson and Human, 2008) . On a much grander scale, GIS also provided the backbone for the Global Natural Disaster Risk Hotspots project undertaken by the World Bank and Columbia University (Dilley, 2006) . It uses hazard frequency and probability data to produce a spatially varying surface of mortality and economic-loss risk to develop a multihazard risk index. However, the project compares conditions between countries rather than at a resolution suitable for subnational-scale analysis. The Urban Disaster Risk Index is not multihazard in nature, but does combine potential seismic physical damage and socioeconomic variables in an effort to create a holistic perspective for disaster risk management at subnational scales (Carren¬ o et al, 2007; Marulanda et al, 2009) .
Common threads in previous multihazard analyses include the use of hazard frequency and area of impact for hazard identification, compilation of dollar losses as a proxy for human system impact, incorporation of social vulnerability, the application of GIS to perform the investigation, and examination at the community or county scale. The methodology described in this paper builds on these efforts, through the aggregation of multiple hazards, use of a wider array of hazard characteristics and historical dollar losses, inclusion of the Social Vulnerability Index, and implementation in a GIS framework at the US county scale. The overall goal is to produce a descriptive product (maps) that displays the spatial variation in hazard characteristics, economic losses, and social vulnerabilityöa product easily understood by emergency managers.
Study area
Charleston County, South Carolina is the test bed for the methodology. Located in the low-country region of South Carolina, Charleston County is a 1480 km 2 expanse bordering the Atlantic Ocean with a population density of approximately 210 people per km 2 . The Charleston region is an ideal study area due to its diversity of hazards (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and hazardous-materials spills), population characteristics, and the nature of the built environment. The county level is also the jurisdictional level at which decision makers typically address DMA 2000 requirements. Table 1 The first three steps involve data collection and preprocessing of input data. The last three steps involve the measurement of hazard impacts using historical event data, as well as a measurement of social vulnerability.
List of hazards
The first step is to develop a preliminary list of hazards for the study area. For inclusion in the spatial analysis, particular hazards must meet three conditions. First, in order to provide insight into the geographic patterns of relative hazardousness, the hazard should exhibit some spatial variability within the analysis area, that is, not have a uniform distribution. Second, the hazard datasets should possess information suitable for developing a zone of impact, or geometry of a hazard zone. Examples include origin (earthquake epicenter, river channel) and severity descriptors (wildfire burn area, hazardous-spill evacuation distance). Third, for each event there must be attribute data such as historical frequency, probability of occurrence, or losses. If any of these requirements is missing, the individual hazard is removed from the analysis. Failure to meet these criteria is not a sign of a lack of importance of the hazard, but instead is an indication of lack of data. 
Damage thresholds
The establishment of thresholds follows the selection of input hazards. The goal is to examine damaging hazard events rather than to compile an exhaustive list of each hazard. To distinguish damaging hazard events from minor ones, descriptive characteristics of magnitude, intensity, frequency, and associated injuries and fatalities were used to establish thresholds for inclusion of individual events. The use of thresholds such as these based on damage ensures that high-frequency, low-impact hazards such as lightning will not affect the aggregate frequencies disproportionately in comparison with the rare, high-impact events such as earthquakes. However, it is important to exercise caution in the selection of thresholds, as the results can be very sensitive to their values. Table 2 provides a list of hazards and associated damage thresholds.
The choice of threshold values was consistent with existing magnitude, intensity, or damage scales. Perhaps the most well-known intensity scale is the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale for earthquakes. The Saffir-Simpson scale for hurricane wind speed and storm surge, and the Fujita tornado-damage classification system are hybrid scales based on magnitude and intensity (Blong, 2003) . For each of these scales, the threshold for inclusion in this study is the category at which damage occurs. This corresponds to MMI category VI for earthquakes, Saffir-Simpson category 1 for hurricane winds and surge, and Fujita F1 for tornadoes. The US National Floodplain Insurance Program, created in 1968, established the 100-year floodplain as the benchmark for floodplain regulation in the US. We used this same standard as the threshold for likely damage by floods. For fixed hazardous-material spills, only those events resulting in an injury or fatality are included. Finally, wildfires are typically measured in terms of acreage burned, with large fires defined as those exceeding 100 acres (40.5 ha) (Schoenberg et al, 2003) . Thus for wildfires the threshold of more than 100 acres burned was used. 
Zone of impact
The next step is to associate an area of impact with each hazard event. The bases for the development of impact areas applied for each hazard are given in table 2. The approach varied according to the type of GIS data used to represent the hazard events.
Point events
Previous research explored the empirical relationship between earthquake moment magnitude and area of damage based on location in the US (Bollinger et al, 1993) . The result is a set of equations for computing the area subject to MMI category VI and category VII damage for the eastern and western US. The area subject to a MMI category VI (slight damage) for the eastern US, using a study of earthquakes with a magnitude of at least 4.4, is computed as follows:
where A represents damage area (km 2 ) and M is moment magnitude. After computing the damage area, the radius for a circle with an equivalent area is calculated and used to buffer the earthquake epicenter. For hazardous-material spills at fixed facilities, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) has established a set of protective-action distances that depend on the chemical toxicity, quantity released (small or large), and wind-dispersion conditions (day or night) (DOT, 2008) . The worst-case scenario of a large-quantity nighttime release was applied for each event, and the resulting protective-action distance is used as a buffer radius for each facility. Wildfire point data are filtered to retain any events that consumed at least 100 acres (40.5 ha). The definition of wildfire impact area is a circular region centered at each point with an area equivalent to the burn area.
Linear events
For hurricanes, studies have shown that the average track width of hurricane-force winds is 100 miles (161 km) (Willoughby et al, 2007) . Accordingly, hurricane-wind impact areas are defined within 80.5 km (50 miles) of historical linear hurricane tracks. In the case of tornados, the impact area is the actual track width, when available .
Area events
Impact areas for flooding and hurricane storm surge are based on publicly available outputs of computer modeling. The US National Hurricane Center used the SLOSH (sea, land, and overland surge from hurricanes) model to estimate the worst-casescenario storm-surge boundaries for the South Carolina coast. The effort produced surge zones for each of the Saffir-Simpson categories. GIS floodplain-boundary representations are available from a number of FEMA sources, including Q3, digital flood-insurance-rate maps, and the HAZUS flood model. These approximate the 100-year floodplain.
Multihazard frequency
The historical frequency of occurrence is computed as the inverse of the period of record. For example, if there are 45 years of tornado records, the frequency of each individual event is calculated as 1 divided by 45. In this manner, every event for a given hazard type is assigned the same frequency. The exception is if you wish to group hazards by severity, for example computing separate frequencies for each Fujita-scale category of tornado intensity. The frequency for each event is then attributed to its impact zone. In locations where impact zones overlap, the associated frequencies are summed in order to generate hazard frequency from event frequencies.
This procedure repeats for each hazard type. The hazard frequencies are summed in each spatial unit and overlapping areas to develop a multihazard frequency map. The results of frequency-based spatial analysis shed light on where hazards occur most often in a given study area, while assessing the relative contribution of each hazard to the multihazard total. Because the frequency calculations include only damaging events, the analysis gives some sense of the relative impact of each threat source. Furthermore, the use of frequency and intensity to construct a spatially distributed risk-exposure model helps to identify locations where more detailed science and engineering analysis may be warranted.
Multihazard losses
The use of multihazard aggregate frequency in vulnerability assessment provides a useful view of the data. Another perspective is through the analysis of historical loss information for buildings and infrastructure. Dollar-loss data in the US are available from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database (SHELDUS) (http://sheldus.org). SHELDUS is an online database containing human and financial loss information at the US county level, for natural hazard events from 1960 to 2008 (HVRI, 2009). The loss totals are conservative, and likely underestimate total dollar losses, due to limitations in the original federal data sources. SHELDUS was used as a source for loss data for natural hazards in previous hazard-mitigation plans for DMA 2000. Recent examples include Sacramento County, CA; Suffolk County, NY; and the state of Montana (HVRI, 2008a).
Social vulnerability
Hazards that are uniform across space often result in widely divergent impacts and recovery rates for those who are affected. Social vulnerability describes this differential susceptibility of people on the basis of social, economic, political, and institutional factors. In the literature, several characteristics have been found to increase or decrease the hazard vulnerability of a population, such as education, occupation, income, age, disabilities, gender, race, immigration status, and population density (Cova and Church, 1997; Cross, 2001; Mileti, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Morrow, 1999; Peacock and Girard, 1997; Phillips and Morrow, 2007; The Heinz Center, 2002; Tierney, 2006) . Table 3 includes the most prominent of these characteristics, as well as descriptions of their importance with respect to hazards.
There are several prominent vulnerability indices, which compare places in terms of their social vulnerability to hazards. The Disaster Risk Index (http://www.undp.org/ cpr/disred/english/wedo/rrt/dri.html) created by the United Nations Development Programme and the Prevalent Vulnerability Index developed by the Instituto de Estudios Ambientales (http://idea.unalmzl.edu.co) are two examples at the national scale. The Disaster Risk Index employs stepwise regression to estimate vulnerability based on mortality risk, while the Prevalent Disaster Index applies weights to selected indicators of population exposure, socioeconomic fragility, and resilience (Pelling, 2006) . The Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) , provides a relative measurement of social vulnerability in the US at subnational scale. SoVI employed principal components analysis to distill a large number of socioeconomic variables known to influence hazard vulnerability into a small set of vulnerability dimensions. Using any of these quantification approaches, locations of clusters of high vulnerability are identifiable. SoVI is currently in the hazard-mitigation plan for the state of California (Governor's Office of Emergency Services, 2008).
Application
The conceptual model for the implementation of the methodology, outlined in figure 1, shows the GIS-based approach. Utilizing this geospatial framework permits a finegrained analysis of the spatial variation in hazard frequencies and associated losses. Also it is easily represented on a map.
Selection of input hazards and impact-area computation
To determine the spatiality of multiple hazards and vulnerability in Charleston County, GIS data describing hazards affecting the study area were gathered. On the basis of the hazard selection criteria discussed earlier, drought and winter storms were uniform in severity across the county, and thus removed from the analysis. Hail and lightning were deleted because they lacked severity data, while hazardousmaterials spills along highways and railroads were removed because the datasets did not include a specific point of origin for each event. The remaining hazards were considered for further analysis, and included earthquake (SCSN, 2007) (NCDC, 2007) , wildfire (South Carolina Forestry Commission, 2007) , and fixed-facility hazardous-material spills (National Response Center, 2007) . For each hazard event, a polygonal area of impact needed to be developed. Flood and hurricane-surge datasets already were polygons, so no further processing was required. Linear (hurricane tracks) and point (earthquake and wildfire) features required buffering by a distance based on intensity or, in the case of wildfire, areal extent. For the tornado data, the track distance for each event was available, but not the direction. So in the absence of path width (or damage swath), we used track distance as the radius to delineate a circular area of impact from the track origin. For all hazards, the resulting polygonal impact zones were clipped to include only areas within Charleston County.
Multihazard-frequency mapping
The frequency of occurrence attributes were then added to the impact-area polygons. The frequencies were summed for overlapping areas using the union operation in GIS. The natural-breaks method of classification was used for the mapping because it is well suited for maximizing differences between classes of data, in this case, the degrees of vulnerability. The output frequency map displays the spatial variation in aggregate event frequency (or risk) across the county (figure 2).
Although the aggregate frequency values are discrete, the map presents the frequency data in ordinal categories. The rationale for the use of ordinal-scale mapping relates to the original goal of the study, which was to produce maps for use as screening tools. The intent was not to quantify the spatial distribution of frequencies and losses, but rather to help decision makers to understand the relative distribution of high and low hazard areas across their jurisdiction. Application of the ordinal scale for mapping accomplishes this goal, generating an easy-to-understand map for prioritizing subcounty areas for more detailed study.
The mapping indicates that the city of North Charleston lies within one of the most hazard-prone areas of the county. In the case of North Charleston, the high multihazard aggregate frequency is driven primarily by hurricane winds and surge, earthquake, and hazardous-material releases from fixed sources.
Multihazard-losses mapping
To incorporate historical hazard losses, the SHELDUS data on property losses from 1960 to 2008 were downloaded. The built-environment footprint was estimated using urbanized areas from land-use and land-cover data (MRLC, 2006) , and used in the GIS to cull the impact areas to include only those areas representing developed landuse classes. We averaged the losses (adjusted to 2008 costings) over the period of record and divided by the built-environment area within the hazard-impact zones to create an average annual loss per km 2 for each hazard. Finally, the average losses for all hazards were summed and mapped using the natural-breaks method for category classification (figure 3).
The loss analysis produced a very different pattern of high and low impact areas compared with aggregate frequency. Dominated by losses from hurricane winds and storm surge, coastal areas show the greatest impact or vulnerability, with losses decreasing when moving inland. Mitigation measures selected strictly according to the loss analysis might focus on places of high average losses such as the cities of Charleston, Mount Pleasant, and Isle of Palms. 
Social-vulnerability mapping
For the spatial modeling of social vulnerability, we obtained demographic data from the US Census 2000 SF1 and SF3 datasets (http://www.census.gov/) in order to compute SoVI for Charleston County. The block-group level was selected for this study because it is the finest resolution at which both the SF1 and SF3 data are available. Block groups were originally designed to represent approximately 400 housing units, with a minimum of 250 and a maximum of 550 housing units (Bureau of the Census, 1994). The census block-group polygonal boundaries were from the Census Bureau's , a total of forty-two indicator proxy variables were extracted from year 2000 Census data for analysis at the county level. At the block-group level of aggregation, only thirty two of these variables were available, and these became the input for the principal components analysis (PCA) (table 4). The PCA was performed using a varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization, and components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were retained (HVRI, 2008b) . This resulted in eight principal components, which collectively explained 72% of the variance in the input variables. Component one, labeled race^class, had high positive correlations with African Americans, service workers, poverty, and lack of high school diplomas, and high negative correlations with per capita income and median home value. The remaining components were labeled elderly, development density, family structure, infirm, race or ethnicity, gender, and occupation. Using the loadings for each census block group, the SoVI results were then mapped using natural breaks ( figure 4) .
The mapped social vulnerability shows a pattern distinct from the frequency and property loss results. For example, the areas of Charleston and Isle of Palms that were ranked high in the loss analysis are low in terms of social vulnerability. Instead, it is primarily rural areas and the urban sections of North Charleston and the Charleston Neck region that warrant the most attention from the perspective of social vulnerability. 
Integration
The final step in this analysis is to provide an aggregate picture of the overall hazardousness of Charleston County, and follows the conceptual framework of the hazards-of-place model of vulnerability (Cutter, 1996) . That model contends that the social and physical vulnerabilities of a particular place are coupled and that the interactions between the two can amplify or reduce vulnerability. To illustrate this interdependence, the maps of multihazard frequency, built-environment losses, and social vulnerability (figures 2^4) were combined to generate a representation of place vulnerability. To do so, the scores (c i ) of each dataset were first rescaled from 0 to 100 using the minimax transformation so that the range of values were equivalent:
To combine the scaled scores, the formulation of H R6V was employed. Here, the multihazard-frequency map serves as a proxy for risk, while the economic-loss and social-vulnerability maps were summed to represent vulnerability (figure 5). When all three perspectives of hazard vulnerability are integrated, the resultant spatial distribution indicates the areas of highest hazard vulnerability are near North Charleston. This is quite distinct from the pattern of high hazard-vulnerability areas along the coast suggested by the loss analysis (or exposure), the current basis for the majority of hazard-mitigation decisions.
By combining frequency of occurrence, infrastructure losses, and social components of hazard vulnerability, a clearer view is generated of not just what is at risk, but who is at risk, and where. This is important because while multihazard mapping is a key step in the creation of hazard-mitigation plans, the ultimate goal in this endeavor is to reduce hazard vulnerability using spatial analysis and mapping in decision making. The multihazard maps can be overlain with available datasets of critical infrastructure located within the community, including lifelines such as water, power, and sewer lines, and critical facilities such as schools, hospitals, emergency shelters, and adult and child care centers. This allows the mapping effort to inform the development and evaluation of educational initiatives, mitigation programs, evacuation plans, and relief services (Morrow, 1999) .
Discussion
The framework presented in this research offers a simplified, yet comprehensive, procedure for completing multihazard-vulnerability assessments. We presented three approaches to multihazard modeling, with each one offering a different perspective on the hazards of place vulnerability. The aggregate-frequency approach examines the overlap of damaging hazard occurrences and identifies the most hazard-prone areas (disaster risk). The historical-loss analysis explores the effects of hazards in terms of their impacts on the built environment (exposure). The social-vulnerability analysis focuses on people, providing insight into differences in short-term coping capacity and long-term recovery potential across the study area (sensitivity). The results from the three approaches (figures 2^4) suggest distinct areas of greatest concern, and offer differing points of view to consumers of the maps, including state and local emergencymanagement and planning officials. Should vulnerability reduction efforts focus on the locations that are the most hazardous, the places experiencing the greatest property losses, or the people who can cope least with hazard impacts, or some combination of these? These are questions perhaps best addressed by local hazard-mitigation and emergency-management officials, and the answers may vary by community. Currently vulnerability reduction measures are based on hazard-specific analyses, which focus solely on built-environment losses. Our goal was to broaden the base of information with which to make decisions.
There are shortcomings inherent in the implementation of the multihazard mapping framework, which warrant further discussion. More specifically, these relate to the use of circular buffers to represent impact areas of point events and the application of SHELDUS for loss estimation. The first weakness is the assumption of circular buffers for point hazard events. As the tornado dataset lacked consistently available track direction and width information, tornado-damage surfaces were modeled as point events with radial effects rather than linear ones. The circular assumption produces a poor estimate of the likely elongated elliptical area of impact, but it is perhaps the best option given the present data constraints. For wildfires as well, the circular shape may not be representative of actual conditions, but the dataset attributes did not define the exact burn pattern, only the number of acres burned. Fixed-facility airborne chemical releases have a known directional bias, and the use of circular buffers has been shown to produce inaccurate estimates of the exposed population (Chakraborty and Armstrong, 1997) . Plume modeling that considers seasonal wind patterns provides better estimates of the likely impact area, but such efforts are both data and computationally intensive. Despite the shortcomings of circular-buffer assumptions in these instances, their use in this study is consistent with the goal of developing a simplified approach whose outputs can be used as part of a screening process for further detailed study.
The second limitation in the implementation relates to the loss analysis. Integrating the annual loss data for each hazard with the impact zone is useful because it allows the user to better comprehend the distinct loss patterns in the study area.
Although informative, the use of SHELDUS losses in conjunction with the hazard-impact areas may be problematic for several reasons. First, the distribution of losses within the built-environment impact zones is unknown because SHELDUS losses are summarized at the county level. As such, losses for a particular hazard are constant across its impact zone. Second, the use of financial losses as a measure of impact overlooks hazards with severity measured in other terms. For example, figure 3 includes no influence of hazardous-materials releases because the damage produced by these events typically is measured in human-health effects, not in monetary losses. Although the loss of life is certainly a measure of impact, it is incongruent with a financial measure. Finally, the use of historical loss data can be misleading if the period of record for events differs significantly from that of the loss information, or is not sufficiently long. Earthquake hazard is notably absent from the loss analysis because no property losses due to earthquakes appear in the SHELDUS database since 1960. There was, however, a major earthquake in Charleston in 1886. To overcome this problem, hazard-specific probabilistic annualized loss analysis would be required.
Conclusions
Recent federal statutory requirements for multihazard mapping, most notably the DMA of 2000, underscore the need for approaches that go beyond simply mapping hazard locations such as earthquake epicenters, hurricane tracks, and flood zones. These efforts adequately identify locations of a few hazards, but generally fail to provide a mechanism for the representation of areas of impact and aggregate severity across multiple hazards. The methodology described in this paper attempts to close these gaps. Several potential problems endemic to the approach were highlighted, yet the approach and framework remain robust and sufficiently flexible to support more detailed analyses at local county or community levels. For example, the impact-area analysis can consider directional bias and decay of severity for hazards such as chemical releases. The economic-loss analysis applied SHELDUS data, but other databases and loss-estimation software can complement the findings. The assessment of social vulnerability could apply relative weights to the demographic variables considered, use a different variable set, or apply a principal components analysis approach similar to SoVI to help understand which social-vulnerability factors account for the greatest degree of variability in a particular study area. Additional dimensions of vulnerability, such as ecological impacts, could be introduced to the analysis of total place vulnerability.
The methodology presented here meets the stated goal of providing a multihazardmapping approach applicable in a screening process for the identification of highly vulnerable areas. The GIS techniques implemented are not overly complex, and the required input data are publicly available, thus facilitating its adoption by a local jurisdiction. The ordinal mapping generates an easy to understand product relevant to emergency managers, planners, and mitigation officials interested in reducing community vulnerability to hazards.
